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Abstract 
Severe working conditions on Thai fishing boats have received international attention as the so-called 
modern slavery, at least, since 2005. Using a survey in 2012 of fishermen on fishing boats in four provinces 
of Thailand conducted by the International Labour Organization, this paper examines the ranges of 
unacceptable working conditions by extending the measurement of forced labour. This paper makes two 
main contributions by identifying the degree of forced labour and measuring their working conditions. 
First, we conceptualise two situations, forced labour and possibly forced labour, with different combinations 
of available variables, which is an attempt to capture the multidimentional complexity in measuring forced 
labour. Second, we analysed the associated working conditions among the workers. We confirmed that 
fishing boats are places of forced labour and destinations of trafficked persons, and that the working 
conditions of forced and possibly forced workers are inferior to those of other workers. 
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1. Introduction 
The abolition of forced labour has been a long-term goal, at least, since the adoption of the Forced 
Labour Convention in 1930, which is one of the fundamental conventions of the International Labour 
Organization (ILO). However, the abolition of forced labour and the enforcement of decent working 
conditions have yet been fully accomplished in most developing countries and even in some developed 
countries.1 Harsh working conditions, including forced labour, are currently called modern slavery and 
are recognised as one of the urgent development targets of governments, the ILO, and human rights 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and as one of the Sustainable Development Goals of the United 
Nations. 
Slavery working conditions, which are characterised by coercion, violence, deception, intimidation, 
and any other means to make a person to work, constitute a failure to provide decent working conditions.2 
The victims of modern slavery are sometimes international migrants that are often intermediated by 
brokers at the origin and at the destination. Such slavery working conditions and incidents of trafficking 
have been found on Thai fishing boats and in seafood processing factories in Thailand, which have 
repeatedly been revealed by many newspapers.3 Including the articles mentioned in footnote 3, Pulitzer 
Prize winning work by Mendoza et al (2016) proved that a direct connection exists between slavery 
working conditions in the Thai fishing sector and in seafood consumed in developed countries.4 They 
documented that some slavery working conditions exists on the Thai fishing boats, that catches were 
manufactured as feed for shrimp and other fish and that slavery working conditions exist at seafood 
processing factories. Such foods are largely exported to various countries. Among them, fishermen on 
                                                        
1 See for example, ILO(2017) on global and regional estimates, which reveals 40 million persons are in modern 
slavery throughout the world. 
2 The menace of penalty and unwillingness are two core concepts that define forced labour according to Article 
29 in the Forced Labour Convention by the ILO. 
3 For example, see Ishaan Tharoor (2009) ‘Abandoned at Sea: The Sad Plight of the Rohingya’, Time, 18 January; 
Jesse Hardman (2011) ‘Escaping from Burma but Falling into Slavery’, Time, 30th September; Kate Hodal, Chris 
Kelly, and Felicity Lawrence (2014) ‘Revealed: Asian Slave Labour Producing Prawns for Supermarkets in US, 
UK’, the Guardian, 10th June; Ian Urbina (2015) ‘”Sea Slaves:” The Human Misery that Feeds Pets and Livestock’, 
New York Times, 27th July; The Economist (2010) ‘Inhospitality: Life gets Harder for Thailand’s Guest-workers’, 
25th February; and The Economist (2015) ‘Here be Monsters: Thailand’s Fishing Industry is Rife with Trafficking 
and Abuse’, 14th March. 
4  Some multinationals are involved in products originating from Thai fisheries. Recent reactions by 
multinationals can be found in the following articles: Ian Urbina (2015) ‘Nestlé Reports on Abuses in Thailand’s 
Seafood Industry’, New York Times, 23rd November, and Margie Mason, Robin McDowell, Martha Mendoza, 
and Esther Htusan (2015) ‘Global Supermarkets Selling Shrimp Peeled by Slaves’, Associated Press, 14th 
December. Recent reactions by the EU can be found in ‘The Country (Thailand) was Warned with a Yellow 
Card due to its Inadequate Fisheries Legal Framework and Poor Monitoring, Control, and Traceability Systems’, 
at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-1457_en.htm.  
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Thai fishing boats, in particular, are at high risk.  
Although many academic studies focused on the Thai fishing sector, until recently, they largely 
focused on resource management and the ocean ecosystem and the slavery working conditions on Thai 
fishing boats had been overlooked. The main objective of this paper is to reveal the working conditions on 
Thai fishing boats and to investigate the potential risk factors for unacceptable working conditions. We 
utilised a unique employment survey of 598 fishermen in four provinces of Thailand in 2012 conducted 
by the ILO. This paper makes at least four contributions. First, it identifies the key variables to find workers 
who are more likely to work under unacceptable working conditions. Second, this paper classifies not only 
“forced labour” according to the definition of the ILO but also possibly forced labour within our sample, 
and examines the differences in working conditions among the workers. Regarding the complexity in the 
multidimensionality of the phenomena and the difficulty in measuring forced labour, as pointed out by 
McCann and Fudge (2017), this paper employs strict criteria for its measurement; the measurement criteria 
may often underestimate the size and effect of forced labour. By marginally extending the measurement 
criteria of forced labour to possibly forced labour, this paper identifies workers who are nearly or “possibly” 
under forced labour. Third, given the difficulty of access to workers in slavery conditions, to our 
knowledge, this paper is the first to quantitatively examine working conditions with the specific questions 
to identify the (possible) forced labour through micro data. The related literature includes child labour 
whose labour participation may not be determined by their own. However, this literature also overlooks 
forced labour of adults. Because adult forced labour is not physically unmatured, such individuals are 
more difficult to identify and count. Lastly, by quantifying the magnitude of the correlation (effect size) 
among the risk factors, this paper shows such factors as criteria or clues to identify forced labour and 
possibly forced labour.  
The main outcomes examined in this paper are working conditions such as economic compensation 
(salary), working hours, workplace safety, and ill-treatment by employers. The key exposure or 
explanatory variables are those that capture the workers’ lack of power to confront/counteract the inferior 
working conditions. These variables cover the concept of forced labor that is strictly and legally defined 
on the basis of the criteria of involuntariness and coercion; other risk factors include not having legal 
documents; deceived into working; debt bondage; and being threatened; and typical personal 
characteristics, such as age, gender, education, literacy, and access to legal protection. 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides background on irregular 
migrants in Thailand and the development of the Thai fishing sector, including attention from academics 
and the international media. Section 3 shows the data and method. Section 4 reports the results of the 
estimations. Section 5 and 6 provide the discussion and conclusion, respectively. 
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2. Background 
This section explains how the influx and status of irregular migrants in Thailand from the three 
neighbouring countries have changed in the last few decades. Because the fishing sector is one of the 
industries that receives irregular migrants, this section provides an overview of the fishing sector, 
including recent discussions in international media. It also describes how studies on the fishing sector in 
Thailand have shifted their focus to the working conditions on Thai fishing boats. 
 
2.1. Low-skilled (irregular) migrants in Thailand 
Along with steady economic growth in Thailand, the employment structure has transformed Thailand 
from an agrarian country to an export-led industrialised country.5 Because of the high labour demand, 
low-wage industries such as agriculture, fishing, and construction offered the major employment 
opportunities for irregular migrant workers in the 1990s.6 Such irregular migrant workers mainly come 
from the three neighbouring countries of Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar.7 Chalamwong (2001) described 
that “Illegal immigrants have become visible in the Thai society after the government decided in 1995 to 
implement a regularisation policy in order to bring them under some form of control.” The estimates of 
irregular (illegal) migrant workers showed growing trends from 40,000 in 1987 to 986,889 in 1998. 8 
Because a number of irregular migrants were already in Thailand and such influx continued, the 
government first conducted the official registration of irregular migrants in 1992. Several rounds of 
registration and re-registration of irregular migrants were conducted from 1992 to 2011.9 However, these 
implementations were not solutions for the influx of irregular migrants but for the ex-post legalisation of 
irregular migrants. Registration can officially allow the irregular migrants to work in low-skilled jobs for 
two years only in the province of registration, with a possible extension of two more years, although they 
are still subject to deportation. From 2002 to 2003, bilateral memorandums of understanding (MOU) were 
signed with all three neighbouring countries with the aim to formalise the migration process of their 
migrant workers. Since 2004, two legalisation methods of irregular workers in Thailand have been 
                                                        
5 According to Timmer, de Vries, and de Vries (2015), the proportion of agricultural employment in Thailand 
decreased from 81.3% in 1960 to 38.3% in 2010. 
6 Irregular migrants refer to migrants who do not have a (temporary) passport, work permit or other documents 
for identification. In Thailand, their legal status is illegal, and they are subject to deportation. 
7  Until around 2003, all low-skilled migrants from the three neighbouring countries in Thailand were 
considered irregular. See Natali et al (2014). 
8 See Table 4 in Chalamwong (2001). 
9 From 1992 to 2006, see Table 25 of Sciortino and Punpuing (2009). For overall historical and recent progress, 
see Hall (2014). 
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implemented. Nationality verification is a method to register an irregular (illegal) worker in Thailand and 
to acquire a legal status through a temporary passport from the source country. The other method is 
registration in the source country under MOUs. Table 1 shows the profiles of migrants in Thailand and 
provides the number of registered migrants by source country, the estimates of nonregistered migrants, 
and the number of refugees mainly from Myanmar. Although the number of migrants from the three 
neighbouring countries has been increasing, the proportion of registered migrants has drastically 
improved from 29.8% in 1998 to 41.2% in 2009. 
 
==Insert Table 1 here== 
 
Regarding the sectoral distribution of registered migrant workers in Thailand who come from the 
neighbouring countries, Table 2 shows that, in 2009, most migrants worked in agriculture, fishery, 
construction, and domestic services. This trend has not changed much since 1998.10 Because the number 
of Burmese workers in Thailand far exceeds that of the other two nationalities, the proportion of Burmese 
workers in each sector is the highest. Except for domestic services, in which men account for only 
approximately 20%, the other sectors are mostly dominated by male migrants. 
 
==Insert Table 2 here== 
 
Because of its informality, the accuracy on estimates of nonregistered migrants cannot be confirmed. 
Pearson et al (2006) included a sample of nonregistered migrants, which may provide an estimate of their 
number and behaviour. However, limited studies have been conducted that can provide plausible 
numbers. Additional studies should reveal the situation of irregular migrants, including their registration 
decisions, working conditions, and experiences, and should evaluate this sample, regardless of their 
registration status, legal status, and nationality. On this point, our data set uniquely covers various 
statuses. 
As an exceptional estimate, Sciortino and Punpuing (2009) determined the approximate monthly 
wages by sector.11 The wages of registered migrants are 38% of those of Thai workers in the fishing sector 
and 39% of those of Thai workers in domestic services.12 The wages of nonregistered migrants range from 
13% of those of Thai workers in domestic services, to 34% of those of Thai workers in the fishing sector, 
                                                        
10 See Table 7 of Chalamwong (2001).  
11 The following numbers are calculated after taking the average of the wage ranges for each category. See Table 
32 of Sciortino and Punpuing (2009) for details. 
12 One exception is the construction sector, and the number is 115%. 
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and to 63% of those of Thai workers in the construction sector. The wages of nonregistered migrants are 
always lower than those of registered migrants, and such differences are larger in domestic services (34%) 
and the agriculture sector (36%), and are relatively smaller in the fishing sector (89%).13 
 
2.2. Fishing sector in Thailand and its working conditions 
Until around 1960, the Thai fishing sector mostly comprised small-scale operations, non-motorized 
and non-mechanised. Soon after the introduction of trawl fishing in 1960, traditional bamboo traps were 
replaced by trawlers and encircling gill nets. In 1965, the number of trawlers exceeded 2,500 and the 
number of encircling gill nets was 600.14 Given the expansion of the types and numbers of gears, the 
annual catch steadily grew from 130,800 tonnes in 1960 to 1,422,321 tonnes in 1978. Except for fluctuations 
in the 1980s, the maximum annual catch was 2,117,929 tonnes in 1995, and the recent annual catch was 
approximately 1.3 million tonnes.15 Thailand is ranked 12th for largest marine capture production using 
the average obtained between 2003 and 2012 and is ranked 16th using production in 2014.16 
Given the growth of large-sale commercial fishing operations, the small-scale operations faced 
difficulties improving their working conditions and living standards. For fisheries during the 1970s–1980s, 
Panayotou (1980) and Panayotou and Panayotou (1986) pointed out the lack of alternative livelihoods at 
fishing villages and the difficulties in changing from fishermen to other occupations. 
Thai ships catch fish from the Gulf of Thailand, the Andaman Sea, and the seas surrounding these 
areas. Given the rapid growth of the fishing sector in Thailand, illegal, unreported, and unregulated 
fishing has become an important problem. This problem also includes overfishing in the territorial sea and 
the adjoining exclusive economic zones. Regarding this point, studies and international discussions 
focused on the ecosystem in and around the territorial sea in the 1980s and 1990s.17 Although sustainable 
fishing in the sea has become an issue under international cooperation and political dialogues initiated by 
the FAO, the discussions were mostly restricted to resource management.18 
In 2005, the working conditions in the fishing sector in Thailand finally received international attention 
                                                        
13 Some qualitative studies of these irregular migrants were conducted by Bowles (1998) and Chantavanich and 
Vungsiriphisal (2012) for Burmese workers and by Derk (2010) and Walsh and Ty (2011) for Cambodian 
workers. 
14 The start of the modernization of Thai fishing was the Official Development Aid for the motorization of ships 
in the 1960s. For details, see Ch. 3 of Panayotou and Jetanavanich (1987). 
15 These numbers are from FAO landings in Table A2 of The et al (2015). 
16 See Table 2 of FAO (2016). 
17 For example, see Pauly and Chuenpagdee (2003) and Cheevaporn et al. (2003). 
18 For example, see Poonnachit-Korsieporn (2000). 
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in the Trafficking in Persons Report, although this report has been published since 2001.19 The Trafficking 
in Persons Report 2005 pointed out that “Thailand’s fishing industry relies heavily on Burmese labour– 
men and women– most of whom are undocumented and highly vulnerable to conditions of forced labour”. 
Although it was not well known, this issue is not new in Thailand, because Hugo (1995) cited some articles 
in the Bangkok Post published in 1993 and Wickramasekera (2002) referred to the fishing sector in Thailand 
as an industry hosting migrant workers. The aforementioned studies estimated the number of irregular 
migrants in the fishing sector in the late 1990s. Due to the high labour demands in the manufacturing and 
service sectors, the labour supply was not sufficient for the fishing sector and other low-skilled sectors. 
Simultaneously, steady economic growth in Thailand caused wages to be much higher than those in the 
neighbouring countries, resulting in irregular migration to Thailand into low-skilled sectors including the 
fishing sector. 
As described in the previous section, most migrant workers in the fishing sector are from neighbouring 
countries. On the way to fishing boats, such migrant workers may be deceived at some point and may be 
transferred. When a person is deceived and transported, he or she may be the victim of “human trafficking.” 
When a person is forced to work against his or her own will and works under the threats of penalty, he or 
she may be the victim of forced labour. Newspaper articles on such experiences have revealed that some 
migrant fishermen were brought to boats without information in advance, saw the killing of crew 
members on boats, and were severely beaten to work; thus, they are clearly the victims of trafficking and 
forced labour. However, the practical classification of workers as forced labour or trafficked persons is not 
easy. In this study, we defined forced labour according to the definition in Article 29 of ILO. Namely, 
workers under forced labour are those who are unwilling to work in the fishing sector and have been 
threatened to work harder and not to escape. To explore the complexity of forced labour, we explicitly 
extended the measurement criteria to “potential forced labour” for those who met the criteria of several 
possible factors indicating coercion, violence, exploitation, vulnerability, and others. 
 
 
3. Data and Methods 
3.1. Data 
  An employment survey covering 596 samples was commissioned by ILO Asia-Pacific to study the 
working conditions in the fishing sector in Thailand. Data collection was conducted from May to 
                                                        
19 Until 2004, the Trafficking in Persons Report pointed out that Thailand is "a source, destination, and transit 
country for trafficking of women and children for sexual exploitation and street begging”; this report 
overlooked men and the situations in the agriculture and fishing sectors. 
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September 2012 by researchers at the Asian Research Center for Migration, Institute of Asian Studies, 
Chulalongkorn University.20 Sampling covered the regional distribution of irregular workers and the 
variation in their source countries. By nationalities, three sample groups predominated the sector: Thai, 
Burmese, and Cambodian.21 The individuals in these samples were selected through stratified, multistage 
accidental sampling. Considering the large geographical variation, after consultation with related 
authorities and experts, the selected study provinces were Ranong, Songkhla, Rayong, and Samut Sakhon. 
Based on the number of legally registered fishermen in each province and after consulting with local 
NGOs, the number of unregistered fishermen was estimated in the sample areas to determine the sample 
ratio of each region. The sample size was decided as 400–625 persons for a population of 100,000 
individuals. On-site, the research team selected individuals of the three nationalities on the fishing boat, 
so that the fishermen were sampled in proportion to the size of the total population by nationality. Among 
the 596 respondents, the composition of nationalities was 8% (n = 49) for Thai, 40% (n = 241) for Cambodian, 
and 51% (n = 306) for Burmese. 
 
 
3.2. Outcome variables of inferior working conditions 
The survey covered variables measuring working conditions from various aspects. We categorised the 
outcomes as follows. Compensation included salary (log monthly wage [THB]); salary deduction, including 
fees for food, water, accommodation, debt, and so on; welfare provision, food, and water; and promotion 
(whether in a high position such as the chief of crew, captain/skipper, mechanic, and steersman). Work 
hours included work hours (typical hours of work on the fishing boat per day, including being on call), 
rest hours (continuous hours of rest typically while on board), and subjective measure of having had 
sufficient rest while on board. Safety included knowing the risk points, ever had accidents at work that 
required a visit to a clinic/hospital, and having first-aid kits on the boat). Ill-treatment included ever 
attempted to escape from the boat, ever seen the employer employ child labour, and ill-treatment on the 
ship (ever threatened with violence, beaten severely, or sold or transferred to another boat, by the 
respondent and other crew members).  
 
==Insert Table 3 here== 
 
                                                        
20 See Chantavanich et al. (2016) and ILO (2013) for details. 
21 Our sample contained no observations from Laos. In ILO (2013; 47-48), there is a story about a Lao fishermen 
who escaped from the slavery working conditions on a fishing boat, was stuck in similar working conditions at a 
Malaysian plantation, deported from Malaysia and detained in Sonklah, Thailand. 
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Table 3 provides summary statistics on the key outcomes. On average, the respondents earned 6,482THB 
per month (S.D.: 4,749.91, median: 5,000). Moreover, 351 respondents reported 13.4 work hours and 5.7 
rest hours on average. Analysis of 496 valid responses indicated that 151 (30%) workers experienced a 
salary deduction. According to an analysis of 596 full responses, 74% reported having sufficient rest on 
board, 22% were provided with welfare benefits, and 88% were adequately provided with water and food. 
A total of 93 (16%) were in a relatively high position (chief of crew, captain/skipper, mechanic, or 
steersman). 
  Regarding safety, 92% were aware of the risk points, 21% experienced accidents, and 73% reported that 
first aids kits were kept on the boat. Regarding ill-treatment, 11% attempted to escape, and 45% had seen 
child labour. Moreover, 18% were threatened with violence, 31% observed such treatment of other crew 
members, 10% were beaten severely, 29% observed severe beatings, 4% were sold or transferred to another 
boat, and 18% observed other crew members being sold or transferred. 
We controlled for typical personal characteristics such as age, gender, literacy in own language 
(dummy variable for the ability to speak, write, and read in own language), ability to speak Thai (four-
point scale: Thai people [reference], none at all, a little, and fairly well or fluently), years of education 
(four-point scales: no schooling [reference], 1–5 years, 6–10 years, and 11+ years), and experience as a 
fisherman (months). 
   Potentially, because the outcomes may depend on the fishing or vessel type, we also controlled for the 
following boat conditions: long haul dummy (duration of the last trip to sea was longer than one month), 
crew size (number of crew members on the boat), and province dummies (province where respondent 
was interviewed). 
 
3.3. Identification of forced labour and personal characteristics 
 
  In our data, we have workers who are defined as forced labour in ILO (2013). We take this ILO’s 
definition as genuine. The workers are considered to be under forced labour if they are unwilling to work 
in the fishing sector (working in the fishing sector against their will) and are unable to leave the employer 
because of penalties. This definition satisfies the two criteria, coercion and involuntariness, that are 
considered as the bases for defining forced labour in the ILO Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 29). 
  However, the measurement criteria of forced labour might be too strict to capture the complex situations 
surrounding them. To expand the scope for the concept of forced labour, we selected various factors that 
capture or are related to workers’ incapability, and we defined workers under potentially forced labour 
as those who experienced at least one of the following six factors; (1) do not have legal documents (No 
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ID); (2) employer demanded to hold ID (Retention of ID); (3) not made own decision to work and was 
deceived (Deception); (4) in debt for recruitment fee (Debt bondage); (5) sold/transferred to another boat 
(Sold/transferred); (6) severely beaten while on board (Beaten); and (7) threatened with violence while on 
board (Threatened). We excluded those identified as forced labour from the sample of potentially forced 
labour, so that potentially forced labour captures the surroundings of the core/strict forced labour. 
 
==Insert Table 4 here== 
 
  Table 4 reports the summary statistics of the explanatory variables. Panel A reports the statistics for 
“forced” labor in our sample, which shows that 101 (17%) respondents are identified as forced labor and 
368 (62%) are identified as potentially forced labor. As our concept of potentially forced labour is the 
marginal observations of the forced labour, we set the classification between forced and potentially forced 
labour as mutually exclusive. In summary, there are 469 (79%) respondents are either or both of forced 
labour or potentially forced labour.  
There are seven criteria for the potentially forced labour; (1) Do not have legal documents (No ID) 51%; 
(2) Employer demanded to hold ID (Retention of ID) 14%; (3) Not made own decision to work and 
deceived (Deception) 4%; (4) In debt for recruitment fee (Debt bondage) 24%; (5) Sold/transferred to 
another boat (Sold/transferred) 4%; (6) Severely beaten while on board (Beaten) 10%; and (7) Threatened 
with violence while on board (Threatened) 17%.  
  Panel B of Table 4 reports the summary statistics of the personal characteristics. For respondents, the 
average age is 28.9 (S.D.: 9.7) years and worked as a fisher for 61.8 (S.D.: 81.1) months. Regarding literacy, 
84.8% (506/596) can speak/write/read in his language. Regarding ability to speak Thai, 8% (49/596) are 
Thai people, 49% (n = 294) cannot speak Thai at all, 34% (n = 205) can speak “a little”, and 8% (n = 48) can 
speak “fairly well or fluently”. Regarding education, 8% (45/596) had no schooling, 51% (n = 305) went to 
school for 1–5 years, 38% (n = 226) went to school for 6–10 years, and 3% (n = 20) went to school for more 
than 10 years. 55% (n=325) have access to info of working rights, but only 3% (n=17) are union member.  
  Finally, Panel C describes the boat conditions. Regarding duration of last out at sea, 18% (n =106) was 
long haul (more than one month). The average number of crew members working on the fishing boat was 
25.8 (S.D.: 11.6) persons. The survey was conducted in four different provinces: Ranong (132/596, 22%), 
Songkla (n = 102, 17%), Rayong (n =187, 31%), and Samut Sakhon (n = 175, 29%).  
We performed mean comparisons of “forced”, “potentially forced” and either/both to the rest. We 
generally observe inferior working conditions for those who are “forced” or possibly “forced” to work; 
they earn less, work longer, and have shorter rest hours. These tendencies are most clear when we adopt 
11 
 
“not own decision” as the “forced” variable.22 
 
3.4. Statistical methods 
  We examined the association among the main outcomes, working conditions, and potential risk factors 
defined in the prior text using descriptive analysis and multivariate regressions. For the descriptive 
analysis, we reported the means of the outcome variables by risk factors. 
  For multivariate regressions, we estimate  
 
𝑦𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐶𝐸1𝑖 + 𝛽1𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐶𝐸2𝑖 +𝑋𝑖𝛾 + 𝜀𝑖 (1) 
 
 
where 𝑦𝑖 is the outcome variable for worker 𝑖, FORCE1𝑖 and FORCE2𝑖 represent our forced labour and 
potentially forced labour variables, 𝑋𝑖 is the vector of personal characteristics and boat conditions, and 
𝜀𝑖 is the error term. We estimate this model by using OLS for continuous outcomes. For discrete outcomes, 
we perform regressions to estimate the aforementioned equation by using a Probit model with the 
maximum likelihood method and reported the average marginal effects. 
  We also examined the correlates of forced labour by estimating 𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐶𝐸𝐷𝑖 . 
 
𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐶𝐸𝐷𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝑋𝑖𝛾 + 𝜀𝑖 (2) 
 
where FORCED𝑖  is the indicator of forced, potentially forced, or both forced and potentially forced. 
Because the dependent variable is discrete, we used a Probit model and reported the average marginal 
                                                        
22 The calculation results are shown in Tables A1 and A2 in the Appendix. The mean values for “own decision” 
workers (n = 528) vs. “not own decision” workers (n = 31) are 8.7 vs. 8.4 (p = 0.005) for log of monthly wage 
(THB); 13.3 vs. 17.1 (p = 0.035) for working hours; and 5.7 vs. 4.3 (p = 0.060) for rest hours. However, the result 
is not as obvious, and the difference is not statistically precise when using “against will” or the complement of 
these two variables.  
  For other outcomes, “not own decision” workers are more likely to have experienced a salary deduction 
(30.1% vs. 50.0%, p = 0.104); less likely to be in a high position (16.7% vs. 0.00%, p < 0.000); took enough rest 
(77.7% vs. 32.3%, p < 0.000); provided welfare (22.7% vs. 6.5%, p = 0.002); provided enough food (90.2% vs. 
58.1%, p = 0.001); aware of risk points (92.8% vs. 80.6%, p =0.106); more likely to have had accident (20.1% vs. 
29.0%, p = 0.298); and less likely to be working on a boat with first-aids kits (75.2% vs. 48.4%, p = 0.007). 
Moreover, they are more likely to have attempted to escape (9.7% vs. 35.5%, p = 0.006); observed  child labor 
(41.5% vs. 90.3%, p < 0.000); threatened with violence (15.9% vs. 51.6%, p = 0.001); observed other crew 
threatened with violence (29.7% vs. 64.5%, p < 0.000); beaten severely (8.7% vs. 38.7%, p = 0.002); observed other 
crew beaten severely (27.3% vs. 64.5%, p < 0.000); sold or transferred to another boat (3.8% vs. 9.7%, p = 0.289); 
and observed other crew being sold or transferred to another boat (16.5% vs. 35.5%, p = 0.040). 
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effects. 
 
4. Results 
4.1. Regression results for working conditions: Forced labour and working conditions 
  We first examined whether “forced” workers work under inferior conditions. By estimating equation 
(1), we showed the differences in the key outcomes of working conditions among the workers. 
  Table 5 lists the estimation results for compensations such as wage, salary deduction, welfare provision, 
food provision, and higher positions.23 For most outcomes, our measures of forced or potentially forced 
workers were negatively correlated with better working conditions, implying that their compensations 
were inferior to those of other workers. Monthly wages were lower by 9.5% (515THB) for forced labour 
and by 7.8% (423THB) for potentially forced labour. For workers classified as “both forced and potentially 
forced”, their monthly wages were 8.2% (445THB) lower. Salary deduction more likely occurred for forced 
labour at 8.7%, although it was less likely or none for potentially forced labour. Welfare provision were 
less likely for forced and potential forced labour and was 10%–11% lower. The provision of food was 7% 
less likely for forced labour but not obvious for potentially forced labour. 
The estimation results for working hours are shown in Table 6. Among 351 respondents, those under 
forced labour worked longer by 2.68 hours and had fewer rest hours by 0.79 hours. Those under potentially 
forced labour worked 0.7 hours less and had fewer rest hours by 1.3 hours. These findings imply the 
ambiguous results for the inferior conditions of potentially forced labour. Regarding safety in the 
workplace, Table 7 shows that that the knowledge of the risks was lower and more accidents occurred for 
forced and potentially forced labour. Their boats were more likely to be equipped with first aid kits, which 
may be due to the high probability of accidents. Regarding ill-treatment occurring on the boats, Table 8 
shows that probability of attempting to escape was higher for forced labour at 5% than for potentially 
forced labour at 1.3%. Forced labour was more likely to have seen child labour on the same boat at 0.13%, 
although potentially forced labour were less likely to have seen child labour at 4%. Forced labour 
(potentially forced labour) were more likely to have ever seen other crew members being threatened at 
24.8% (11.1%), beaten at 26.8% (13.4%), and sold/transferred to other boats at 11.4% (4.8%). These findings 
clearly show that the situation of forced labour is much more severely coercive, and the situation of 
potentially forced labour is intermediate forced labour and nonforced labour. 
 
==Insert Tables 5, 6, 7, and 8 here== 
 
                                                        
23 Full estimates for Tables 5–8 are reported in Table A3–A6 in the Appendix. 
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4.2. Regression results for working conditions after disaggregation of the criteria for potentially forced 
labour: Correlates of working conditions 
 
  Instead of aggregating the seven criteria for determining potentially forced labour, this section shows 
the disaggregated relationships of the seven potential factors with the outcomes in Table 9.24 
   Regarding salary level, among the seven criteria, working not own decision was −25% (1,357THB) and 
was far higher than the correlation of forced labour with the log of monthly wage, which was 0.4%. Other 
criteria ranged from negative such as −9.8% for violence, −8.8% for No ID, −4.3% for indebtedness, and 
−3.5% for confiscation of ID to positive such as 11.3% for severe violence and 3.6% for seeing other crew 
members sold to other boats. The two positive correlations for severe violence of oneself and of other 
crews may be attributed to coercive and violent work, which increase the productivity of workers.25 Other 
than the seven criteria, the experience of working as fishermen (in months) was positively correlated. 
Proficiency in Thai is important. Compared with those who spoke Thai fairly well or fluently, non-Thai 
speaking workers received 9.7% lower wages, and even those who spoke a little Thai received 2.4% lower 
wage. Years of education was negatively correlated, implying that less educated workers received a higher 
wage. Although workers with access to legal rights information received 12.3% lower wages, union 
members received 9.3% higher wages. Workers on long haul boats received 3.0% higher wages. Regarding 
the difference in wages in the four provinces, wages were the lowest in Rayong and were 2.3% lower than 
those in Ranong. Compared with workers in Ranong, those in Songkla had the highest wage, at 22.6% 
higher, and the wages in Samut Sakhon were 17.4% higher. 
   Longer working hours were observed when working conditions were classified as forced labour or 
when some of the criteria were met. Specifically, working hours were 4.3 hours longer for working not 
own decision, 2.21 hours longer for forced labour, and 2.64 hours longer for those threatened with violence. 
Differences were also observed in working hours depending on verbal ability. By using Thai natives as 
the benchmark, all three Thai-speaking levels showed longer working hours; 5 hours for nonspeakers, 3.4 
hours for beginners, and 4.5 hours for fluent speakers. These results suggest that the workload on the boat 
is different at least between Thai and non-Thai workers. 
   The experience of attempting to escape was 20% higher for working not own decision and 16.4% higher 
for those threatened with violence. These findings are reasonable considering that they perceive their 
situation as similar to forced labour. 
                                                        
24 The full estimates for the rest of the outcome variables considered in the previous sections are reported in 
Table A7 in the Appendix. 
25 One possible interpretation of this positive correlation may be that more severe working conditions may be 
compensated by higher wages. 
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== Insert Table 9 here. == 
 
4.3. Regression results for forced labour and the personal characteristics: Correlates of forced labour 
 
  Because we found that forced or potentially forced labour was negatively associated with working 
conditions, we examined the factors associated with workers being forced to work. By estimating equation 
(2), we analysed the correlates of personal characteristics. Table 10 presents the maximum likelihood 
estimates of Probit model regressing of “forced” dummies on various personal characteristics and boat 
conditions. The first column in Table 10 shows the results for forced labour, in which younger 
inexperienced fishermen were more likely to be forced or possibly forced to work. Proficiency of own 
language had a lower probability at 4.9%, although slight differences (less than 1%) were observed in 
fluency in speaking Thai among the different Thai-speaking levels. The positive coefficients for “access to 
information on legal rights” and “union membership” may imply reverse causality, suggesting that 
workers under harsh working conditions attempt to improve their conditions by obtaining such 
information and external assistance. The positive coefficient of “long-haul” of 5.1% implies that long haul 
boats are more likely to be places of forced labour, because the boats from the shore and are far from the 
homeport; thus, it is relatively easy to hold the workers in complete isolation and captivity. For potentially 
forced labour, the results are similar but different in the size effects of language proficiency in own 
language and Thai, and years of education. A negative correlation was observed for long haul, which is 
the opposite result of that of forced labour. The results of the combination of forced labour and potentially 
forced labour are shown in column 3 of Table 10, which confirmed that the difference in Thai speaking 
ability was approximately 2.5% between fairly well or fluent and none or a little. The possible reverse 
causality in “access to information on legal rights” and “union membership” was again found. 
Regarding regional variations, Samut Sakhon had highest probability of forced labour at 31.8%, 
whereas the other three provinces had a probability less than 4.2%. In contrast to the regional variation for 
forced labour, Samut Sakhon was ranked the lowest, and Rayong and Songkla had higher probabilities of 
36.6% and 35.1%. Combining both types, Ranong was ranked the lowest (benchmark), and Songkla was 
the highest at 35.4%. 
 
== Insert Table 10 here. == 
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5. Discussion 
5.1. Key results 
   Considering the forced labour definition by the ILO and its direct measurement, a comparison of the 
outcomes showed that forced labour received much fewer rewards and faced more difficult working 
conditions, and more severe threats. By marginally extending the measurement of forced labour to 
possibly forced labour, we found that the workers in this category are less exploited than those classified 
as forced labour but are more exploited than non-forced labour. They earned less, worked longer, had 
shorter resting periods, experienced salary deduction, did not rest enough, were less likely to receive 
welfare and enough food, attempted to escape, observed child labour, and experienced and observed ill-
treatment such as being threatened with violence, beaten severely, and sold or transferred to other boats. 
   We also confirmed that the seven criteria to include possibly forced labour captured certain aspects of 
forced labour, implying that these observable features can be used as identifiers of forced labour and 
potential victims. 
 
5.2. Limitations 
   Our study has at least, five limitations in our study; three related to data collection and two related to 
the research framework. First, because the population of forced labour is difficult to find and access, it is 
far more difficult to conduct any systematic surveys. This survey attempted to mitigate the possible bias 
resulting from the sampling by reflecting regional differences in composition of nationalities and ship-
types. However, the observations were not randomly sampled. Interviews can be performed only when 
the boats returned to the ports. Also, the timing of the return depends on the weather, the type of vessels, 
and the fishing method preferred by the owners or captains. Thus, data collection cannot be systematically 
scheduled.26 Second, the choice of vessels for the interview was sometimes determined by the connection 
with partner NGOs or the fishers’ association.27 Third, finding long-haul ships to interview was relatively 
difficult because not all of them are members of the fishers’ association, and sometimes their return was 
not informed to authorities or associations. 
Fourth, this study is very specific to the fishing sector in Thailand, and generalizing the findings to 
other sectors is difficult. In particular, fishing boats are closed circumstances. However, the criteria for 
potentially forced labour were confirmed to be effective in finding possibly forced labour. Fifth, 
establishing from our study possible solutions to rescue workers under forced labour is still difficult. 
                                                        
26 Randomising the timing of interviews and setting the interviews during monsoon seasons may help to 
diversify vessel types. 
27  Collaborative associations were the Thailand Overseas Fishing Association and the National Fisheries 
Association of Thailand. 
16 
 
Suggested solutions include access to lawyers and NGOS, and the presence of trade unions. However, the 
effectiveness of any possible intervention requires rigorous program evaluations. On this point, future 
research should seek to evaluate training programs for fishing skills and human resource management, 
and to inspection for illegal fishing, labour law and human rights. 
Although conducting a labour force survey for fishing sector, it is not impossible to implement such a 
labour force survey in two steps. First, with the help of NGOs, fishery authorities, and associations of 
fishermen and seafood factories, as is done in ILO (2013), lists of registered fishing vessels and factories 
may be made available. Second, by randomly selecting the sample from the list, evaluating the impacts of 
available and desired interventions are possible. Such interventions may include programmes for safety 
and health at work, introductory training for non-experienced fishermen, technique to efficiently drive 
vessels and efficient factory, guidance for lawful labour managements, and etc. To abolish the 
unacceptable working conditions from the workplaces, technological and management assistance to the 
sector is required, along with pointing out the presence of slavery working conditions and boycotting the 
products. In particular, given the current revision trends in Global Value Chains (GVCs) of seafood, 
eliminating unlawful firms from the GVCs is not the complete solution because unacceptable workplaces 
are still excluded from GVC and left in developing countries. To achieve the abolition of slavery 
workplaces, another century may be needed to convert these unacceptable workplaces into acceptable 
ones. Thus, we need to be ready to continuously attempt to combine supports to improve work practices 
and inspections to eliminate unlawful workplaces.  
Another important issue that we could not address was the recruitment process. Because some victims 
of forced labour mentioned that the labour contract was absent and oral contracts were also violated, the 
typical asymmetric information problem exists in this matching process between workers and workplaces. 
The problem also includes advanced payments, worker indebtedness and the promise of incentives for 
long-term work, making it difficult for workers to escape. The fundamental solution to this problem has 
yet to be found.  
Compared with other sectors that have been pointed out as places with working conditions conductive 
to slavery, such as the construction sector, domestic work, and agriculture, capturing a comprehensive 
picture may be easier for fishing sector because fishing vessels may be largely registered and need to 
return to ports. Sector-specific difficulties exist in obtaining a list of potential slavery workplaces.  
 
6. Concluding Remarks 
 
   This paper examined the working conditions on the Thai fishing boats and confirmed the presence of 
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forced labour and identified forced labour and potentially forced labour, using the strict measurement 
criteria and the extended measurement criteria. Workers in both categories are under harsher working 
conditions than others and are more likely to be underpaid, overworked, beaten, and threatened with 
violence. This study captured the multidimensionality and associated complexity of the inferior working 
conditions by adding seven factors to potentially reflect forced labour. It showed that most of the outcomes 
related to working conditions are the worst for forced labour. In contrast, it also showed that most of the 
key outcomes for potentially forced labour are ranked lower than forced labour but are sometimes ranked 
higher than that of the other workers, implying that our classification of potentially forced labour may 
have included some parts of nonforced labour. These difficulties are observed in the practical classification 
of working conditions. Given such difficulties, the overall improvements in working conditions may 
benefit all ranges of workers. For such improvements, several measures need to be implemented. First, 
systematic inspections at ports can find forced labour in severe situations. Second, it is crucial to raise 
awareness among employers, captains, and workers that the coercion and violence that forces people to 
work are criminal. Third, ensuring access to outsiders such as NGOs or a helpline can be helpful to workers 
on boats. Fourth, a labour contract should include informed consent.  
   Future studies may conduct an employee survey that can better reveal the working conditions of forced 
labour and potential forced labour, because such a survey can show the coexistence of workers under 
various backgrounds and working conditions at the same place or in similar places. For such a survey, 
one of the challenges may be the availability of a comprehensive list of employers. It is also desirable to 
implement and evaluate possible interventions after finding out the best practices to eliminate 
unacceptable workplaces.  
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Table 1.Number and composition of migrants from neighbouring countries
Category 1998 2009 2013
Migrants from Cambodia, Laos and 986,889 2,455,744 2,675,762
Registered or with work permit a 293,652 1,010,941b,c 1,082,892
Cambodia 8.7% 9.5% 10.0% d
Laos 3.9% 8.4% 3.5% d
Myanmar 87.3% 82.1% 86.5% d
Non-registered and irregular status 693,237 1,444,803 1,592,870
Refugees and asylum-seekers 110,000 141,076 127,038
Note:  a)  Compositions  of  registered  migrants  are  shown  in  percentage  since  the  numbers  of “Registered or with work
permit” don’t always match with the sum of composition; b) the number is the end of 2010; c) this is the sum of "Regular new
entrants under MOU" and "Entered or completed NV  process";d)  the  decomposition  of  origin  countries  for  2013  is  based
on  the  "nationality verification process" only.
Source: Compiled by the authors from the following tables; compositions of registered migrants are from Table 6 of
Chalamwong (2001) for 1998, Table 1.4. of Huguet et al (2011) for 2009, and Table 1.3. of Huguet (2014) for 2013; all of the other
data are from Table 6 of Chalamwong (2001) for 1998, Table 1.1. of Huguet et al (2011) for 2009 and Table 1.1. of Huguet (2014)
for 2013.
Registered in official camps - 95,330 78,575
Unregistered and other categories - 45,746 48,463
Category Number of migrants Sectoral share Cambodia Laos Myanmar
Total 1,314,382 9% 8% 82%
Agriculture 295,860 22.5% 10.5% 7.6% 81.9%
Construction 220,236 16.8% 14.7% 5.7% 79.5%
Fishery 193,551 14.7% 10.8% 1.5% 87.6%
Fishing 56,578 4.3% 26.5% 3.2% 70.4%
Seafood processing 136,973 10.4% 4.4% 0.9% 94.7%
Mining 87,644 6.7% 8.4% 19.6% 72.0%
Manufacturing 71,619 5.4% 4.7% 13.3% 82.0%
Home maid 129,790 9.9% 5.1% 16.4% 78.5%
Transport 9,596 0.7% 26.1% 6.3% 67.7%
Trade 42,814 3.3% 11.2% 17.7% 71.2%
Others 261,429 19.9% 5.9% 6.3% 87.7%
Table 2. Registered migrant workers in Thailand from the neighbouring countries
  Share by origin
Source: Author's calculation of Table 1.4. Huguet et al (2011).
Table 3. Summary statistics of key outcomes
Obs
Mean
or
n (yes)
Std. Dev.
or
%
Min Max
Panel A. Compensation
ln(monthly wage in THB) 596 8.6 0.5 6.9 11.2
Deduction of salary (dummy) 496 151 30%
Provided welfare? (dummy) 596 131 22%
Provided enough food? (dummy) 596 529 89%
Panel B. Work hours
Work hours (hrs) 351 13.4 6.7 1 24
Rest hours (hrs) 375 5.7 3.8 1 21
Enough rest? (dummy) 596 439 74%
Panel C. Safety
Know risk points (dummy) 596 548 92%
Had accident (dummy) 596 123 21%
Have first aids kits on boat (dummy) 596 436 73%
Panel D. Ill-treatment
Ever tried to escape (dummy) 596 66 11%
Ever seen employer employ children (dummy) 552 246 45%
Ever threatened with violence, respondent (dummy) 596 104 17%
Ever threatened with violence, other crew (dummy) 596 182 31%
Ever beaten severely, respondent (dummy) 596 60 10%
Ever beaten severely, other crew (dummy) 596 170 29%
Ever been sold or transferred to other boat, respondent (dummy) 596 24 4%
Ever been sold or transferred to other boat, other crew (dummy) 596 106 18%
Table 4. Summary statistics of explanatory variables
Obs
Mean
or
n (yes)
Std. Dev.
or
%
Min Max
Panel A. "Forced" labor
Forced labor 596 101 17% 495
Potentially forced labor 596 368 62% 228
  Do not have legal documents 596 303 51%
  Employer demanded to hold ID 596 82 14%
  Not made own decision to work and deceived 596 26 4%
  Indebt for recruitment fee 596 146 24%
  Sold/transferred to another boat 596 24 4%
  Severely beaten 596 60 10%
  Threatened with violence 596 104 17%
Either/both forced or potentially forced labor 596 469 79% 127
Panel B. Personal characteristics
Age 596 28.9 9.7 12 69
Months worked as a fisherman (months) 596 61.8 81.1 1 504
Can speak/write/read in his language (dummy) 596 506 85%
Can speak Thai (dummy)
  Thai people  (reference) 596 49 8%
  None at all 596 294 49%
  A little 596 205 34%
  Fairly well / Fluently 596 48 8%
Years of education
  No schooling  (reference) 596 45 8%
  1 - 5 years 596 305 51%
  6 - 10 years 596 226 38%
  11+ years 596 20 3%
Have access to info of working rights (dummy) 596 325 55%
Member of trade union, etc. (dummy) 596 17 3%
Panel C. Boat conditions
Long haul (duration of last out at sea > 1 month) (dummy) 596 106 18%
Number of crew members on the boat (persons) 596 25.8 11.6 2 54
Province
  Ranong (reference) 596 132 22%
  Songkla 596 102 17%
  Rayong 596 187 31%
  Samut Sakhon 596 175 29%
Table 5. Regression results: Compensation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Forced -0.0953 0.0874 -0.105* -0.0719
(0.0684) (0.0723) (0.0430) (0.0523)
Potentially forced -0.0787 -0.0162 -0.107* 0.000483
(0.0526) (0.0568) (0.0449) (0.0360)
Either/both forced or potentially forced -0.0820 0.00496 -0.116* -0.0164
(0.0522) (0.0547) (0.0478) (0.0328)
Observations 596 596 496 496 596 596 596 596
R-sq 0.253 0.253
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Source: Authors' calculation
ln(wage) Provided welfare? Enough food?
OLS Probit Probit Probit
Deduction of salary
Table 6. Regression results: Work hours
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Forced 2.688* -0.793 -0.0855
(1.170) (0.668) (0.0675)
Potentially forced -0.709 -1.306* -0.00938
(0.970) (0.596) (0.0516)
Either/both forced or potentially forced -0.0390 -1.193* -0.0247
(0.939) (0.584) (0.0495)
Observations 351 351 375 375 596 596
R-sq 0.247 0.219 0.251 0.249
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Source: Authors' calculation
Table 7. Regression results: Safety
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Forced -0.0375 0.0564 0.0837
(0.0474) (0.0646) (0.0562)
Potentially forced -0.00493 0.100* 0.0306
(0.0332) (0.0428) (0.0529)
Either/both forced or potentially forced -0.0111 0.0868* 0.0436
(0.0307) (0.0384) (0.0532)
Observations 596 596 596 596 596 596
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Source: Authors' calculation
Know risk points Had accident First aids kits on boat
Probit Probit Probit
Work hours Rest hours Enough rest?
OLS OLS Probit
Table 8. Regression results: Ill-treatment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Forced 0.0551 0.248*** 0.268*** 0.114
(0.0610) (0.0745) (0.0738) (0.0666)
Potentially forced 0.0135 0.111* 0.134** 0.0486
(0.0416) (0.0483) (0.0455) (0.0442)
Either/both forced or potentially forced 0.0203 0.131** 0.150*** 0.0569
(0.0383) (0.0455) (0.0421) (0.0391)
Observations 596 596 596 596 596 596 596 596
Source: Authors' calculation
Tried to escape Threatened Beaten Sold/transferred
(other crew) (other crew) (other crew)
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Probit Probit Probit Probit
Table 9. Decomposition of seven criteria: outcomes
Regression results
(1) (2) (3)
ln(wage) Work Tried to
hours escape
OLS OLS Probit
Forced labor 0.00428 2.215* -0.00699
(0.0495) (0.941) (0.0337)
  Do not have legal documents -0.0881* -2.735** -0.0921**
(0.0442) (0.880) (0.0292)
  Employer demanded to hold ID -0.0346 -0.149 -0.0720*
(0.0789) (1.120) (0.0288)
  Not made own decision to work and deceived -0.250* 4.296 0.207*
(0.103) (2.189) (0.0926)
  Indebt for recruitment fee -0.0425 0.868 -0.0266
(0.0413) (0.791) (0.0268)
  Severely beaten 0.113 -1.160 0.0407
(0.0672) (1.156) (0.0448)
  Sold/transferred to another boat 0.0380 -0.133 0.174
  Threatened with violence -0.0985 2.644** 0.164***
(0.0570) (0.813) (0.0463)
Observations 596 351 596
R-sq 0.271 0.306
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Source: Author's calculation
Table 10. Decomposition of seven criteria: determinants
Regression results
(1) (2) (3)
Forced PotentiallyEither/both
forced
Probit Probit Probit
Age -0.0000543 -0.000501 -0.000152
(0.00171) (0.00217) (0.00157)
Months worked as a fisherman -0.00112** -0.000305 -0.000551*
(0.000403) (0.000334) (0.000247)
Can speak/write/read in his language (dummy) -0.0492 -0.00880 -0.0502
Can speak Thai (dummy) (0.0545) (0.0644) (0.0507)
  None at all 0.305** 0.532***
(0.102) (0.0875)
  A little 0.0412 0.305** 0.531***
(0.0353) (0.0978) (0.0837)
  Fairly well / Fluently 0.0464 0.270* 0.501***
Years of education (0.0656) (0.106) (0.0907)
  1 - 5 years -0.104 0.0975 -0.0182
(0.0748) (0.0831) (0.0629)
  6 - 10 years -0.0660 0.0361 -0.0457
(0.0830) (0.0914) (0.0682)
  11+ years -0.197* 0.0870 -0.108
(0.0888) (0.122) (0.101)
Access to information on regal rights (dummy) 0.0291 0.0219 0.0238
(0.0408) (0.0477) (0.0350)
Union member (dummy) 0.0143 0.0222 0.0479
(0.0965) (0.0992) (0.0545)
Long haul (dummy) 0.0513 -0.00749 0.0451
(0.0444) (0.0517) (0.0357)
Crew size -0.00245 0.000153 -0.00279*
(0.00153) (0.00175) (0.00130)
Province: Songkla -0.0422 0.351*** 0.354***
(0.0401) (0.0608) (0.0538)
Province: Rayong -0.0378 0.366*** 0.350***
(0.0475) (0.0652) (0.0528)
Province: Samut Sakhon 0.318*** -0.00479 0.286***
(0.0691) (0.0779) (0.0631)
Observations 547 596 596
Source: Author's calculation
Notes: There is no Thai in forced labour and the baseline is set as no ability to speak Thai in
the first column; Robust standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Table A1. Mean comparison of key outcomes of working conditions
All Forced (n =101)
Not
forced
 (n =495)
Diff p Forced (n =368)
Not
forced
 (n =228)
Diff p Forced (n =469)
Not
forced
 (n =127)
Diff p
Diff:
Forced -
potential
p
ln(monthly wage in THB) 8.6 8.6 8.7 -0.1 0.165 8.6 8.7 -0.1 0.001 8.6 8.9 -0.3 0.000 0.0 0.934
Deduction of salary (dummy) 0.304 0.457 0.275 0.182 0.003 0.272 0.361 -0.089 0.043 0.310 0.283 0.027 0.598 0.185 0.003
Provided welfare? (dummy) 0.220 0.168 0.230 -0.062 0.141 0.171 0.298 -0.127 0.000 0.171 0.402 -0.231 0.000 -0.003 0.946
Enough food? (dummy) 0.888 0.762 0.913 -0.151 0.001 0.913 0.846 0.067 0.018 0.881 0.913 -0.033 0.263 -0.151 0.001
Work hours (hrs) 13.4 14.9 13.1 1.8 0.045 13.3 13.5 -0.2 0.829 13.7 12.4 1.2 0.147 1.6 0.091
Rest hours (hrs) 5.7 5.4 5.8 -0.3 0.509 5.3 6.3 -1.0 0.023 5.4 7.0 -1.6 0.004 0.1 0.840
Enough rest? (dummy) 0.737 0.604 0.764 -0.160 0.003 0.774 0.675 0.099 0.009 0.738 0.732 0.005 0.902 -0.170 0.002
Know risk points (dummy) 0.919 0.871 0.929 -0.058 0.104 0.929 0.904 0.026 0.277 0.917 0.929 -0.012 0.639 -0.058 0.110
Had accident (dummy) 0.206 0.188 0.210 -0.022 0.611 0.201 0.215 -0.014 0.688 0.198 0.236 -0.038 0.369 -0.013 0.770
Have first aids kits on boat (dummy) 0.732 0.733 0.731 0.001 0.978 0.715 0.759 -0.044 0.233 0.719 0.780 -0.061 0.152 0.018 0.720
Ever tried to escape (dummy) 0.111 0.158 0.101 0.057 0.143 0.103 0.123 -0.020 0.469 0.115 0.094 0.021 0.491 0.055 0.168
Ever seen employer employ children (dummy) 0.446 0.600 0.412 0.188 0.001 0.402 0.514 -0.112 0.010 0.447 0.440 0.008 0.884 0.198 0.001
Ever threatened with violence, respondent (dummy) 0.174 0.277 0.154 0.124 0.010 0.207 0.123 0.084 0.006 0.222 0.000 0.222 0.000 0.071 0.155
Ever threatened with violence, other crew (dummy) 0.305 0.455 0.275 0.181 0.001 0.280 0.346 -0.067 0.091 0.318 0.260 0.058 0.196 0.176 0.002
Ever beaten severely, respondent (dummy) 0.101 0.218 0.077 0.141 0.001 0.103 0.096 0.007 0.789 0.128 0.000 0.128 0.000 0.115 0.011
Ever beaten severely, other crew (dummy) 0.285 0.446 0.253 0.193 0.000 0.258 0.329 -0.071 0.068 0.299 0.236 0.062 0.152 0.187 0.001
Ever been sold or transferred to other boat, respondent (dummy) 0.040 0.040 0.040 -0.001 0.970 0.054 0.018 0.037 0.013 0.051 0.000 0.051 0.000 -0.015 0.519
Ever been sold or transferred to other boat, other crew (dummy) 0.178 0.238 0.166 0.072 0.118 0.168 0.193 -0.025 0.454 0.183 0.157 0.026 0.486 0.069 0.142
Source: Authors' calculation
Table A2. Mean comparison of key characteristics of respondents
All Forced (n =101)
Not
forced
 (n =495)
Diff p Forced (n =368)
Not
forced
 (n =228)
Diff p Forced (n =469)
Not
forced
 (n =127)
Diff p
Diff:
Forced -
potential
p
Age 28.9 26.9 29.3 -2.4 0.007 28.0 30.4 -2.4 0.004 27.7 33.1 -5.4 0.000 -1.1 0.233
Months worked as a fisherman (months) 61.8 31.6 67.9 -36.3 0.000 49.3 81.9 -32.6 0.000 45.5 121.9 -76.4 0.000 -17.7 0.001
Can speak/write/read in his language (dummy) 0.849 0.842 0.851 -0.009 0.823 0.818 0.899 -0.081 0.004 0.823 0.945 -0.122 0.000 0.024 0.571
Can speak Thai (dummy)
  Thai people  (reference) 0.082 0.000 0.099 -0.099 0.000 0.027 0.171 -0.144 0.000 0.021 0.307 -0.286 0.000 -0.027 0.001
  None at all 0.493 0.614 0.469 0.145 0.008 0.530 0.434 0.096 0.023 0.548 0.291 0.257 0.000 0.084 0.130
  A little 0.344 0.307 0.352 -0.045 0.382 0.356 0.325 0.031 0.431 0.345 0.339 0.007 0.886 -0.049 0.351
  Fairly well / Fluently 0.081 0.079 0.081 -0.002 0.957 0.087 0.070 0.017 0.455 0.085 0.063 0.022 0.377 -0.008 0.801
Years of education
  No schooling  (reference) 0.076 0.119 0.067 0.052 0.130 0.073 0.079 -0.006 0.804 0.083 0.047 0.036 0.117 0.045 0.198
  1 - 5 years 0.512 0.515 0.511 0.004 0.946 0.530 0.482 0.047 0.261 0.527 0.457 0.070 0.163 -0.015 0.790
  6 - 10 years 0.379 0.356 0.384 -0.027 0.604 0.361 0.408 -0.046 0.259 0.360 0.449 -0.088 0.076 -0.005 0.927
  11+ years 0.034 0.010 0.038 -0.028 0.031 0.035 0.031 0.005 0.757 0.030 0.047 -0.017 0.397 -0.025 0.067
Have access to info of working rights (dummy) 0.545 0.446 0.566 -0.120 0.029 0.541 0.553 -0.012 0.778 0.520 0.638 -0.118 0.017 -0.095 0.092
Member of trade union, etc. (dummy) 0.029 0.030 0.028 0.001 0.939 0.022 0.039 -0.018 0.238 0.023 0.047 -0.024 0.240 0.008 0.669
Duration of last trip on sea < 1 month (dummy) 0.822 0.743 0.838 -0.096 0.042 0.845 0.785 0.060 0.071 0.823 0.819 0.004 0.915 -0.103 0.033
Crew members working on the fishing boat (persons) 25.8 24.8 26.0 -1.2 0.286 26.0 25.5 0.5 0.618 25.7 26.1 -0.4 0.769 -1.2 0.310
Province
  Ranong (reference) 0.221 0.158 0.234 -0.076 0.067 0.168 0.307 -0.139 0.000 0.166 0.425 -0.259 0.000 -0.010 0.808
  Songkla 0.171 0.129 0.180 -0.051 0.177 0.226 0.083 0.142 0.000 0.205 0.047 0.157 0.000 -0.097 0.016
  Rayong 0.314 0.129 0.352 -0.223 0.000 0.416 0.149 0.267 0.000 0.354 0.165 0.189 0.000 -0.287 0.000
  Samut Sakhon 0.294 0.584 0.234 0.350 0.000 0.190 0.461 -0.270 0.000 0.275 0.362 -0.087 0.068 0.394 0.000
Source: Authors' calculation
Forced Potentially forced Either/both
Forced Potentially forced Either/both
Table A3. Correlates of working conditions (1): compensation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Forced -0.0953 0.0874 -0.105* -0.0719
(0.0684) (0.0723) (0.0430) (0.0523)
Potentially forced -0.0787 -0.0162 -0.107* 0.000483
(0.0526) (0.0568) (0.0449) (0.0360)
Either/both forced or potentially forced -0.0820 0.00496 -0.116* -0.0164
(0.0522) (0.0547) (0.0478) (0.0328)
Age -0.00175 -0.00176 0.000266 0.000316 0.00127 0.00127 0.00176 0.00158
(0.00201) (0.00201) (0.00224) (0.00225) (0.00189) (0.00189) (0.00147) (0.00146)
Months worked as a fisherman 0.00190*** 0.00190*** 0.000677* 0.000634* 0.000210 0.000212 -0.000701** -0.000670**
(0.000399) (0.000395) (0.000305) (0.000306) (0.000258) (0.000257) (0.000214) (0.000214)
Can speak/write/read in his language (dummy) -0.0505 -0.0501 -0.0926 -0.0972 0.119** 0.119** 0.0151 0.0154
Can speak Thai (dummy) (0.0631) (0.0632) (0.0613) (0.0616) (0.0459) (0.0459) (0.0497) (0.0498)
  None at all -0.310** -0.313** 0.126 0.137 0.00468 0.00368 -0.138*** -0.140***
(0.102) (0.102) (0.0851) (0.0818) (0.0801) (0.0804) (0.0255) (0.0250)
  A little -0.213* -0.216* 0.0932 0.108 0.0389 0.0374 -0.129*** -0.132***
(0.106) (0.106) (0.0821) (0.0788) (0.0777) (0.0779) (0.0271) (0.0267)
  Fairly well / Fluently -0.176 -0.179 0.182 0.202* 0.0862 0.0844 -0.0882* -0.0910*
Years of education (0.110) (0.109) (0.0952) (0.0930) (0.0888) (0.0890) (0.0396) (0.0392)
  1 - 5 years 0.140 0.142 -0.0745 -0.0837 -0.141 -0.140 -0.0717** -0.0679*
(0.0738) (0.0736) (0.0780) (0.0785) (0.0826) (0.0826) (0.0261) (0.0285)
  6 - 10 years 0.0836 0.0846 -0.0749 -0.0816 -0.162 -0.161 -0.141*** -0.141***
(0.0829) (0.0828) (0.0876) (0.0879) (0.0902) (0.0903) (0.0342) (0.0359)
  11+ years -0.0323 -0.0299 -0.151 -0.166 -0.184 -0.182 -0.109 -0.104
(0.115) (0.115) (0.132) (0.130) (0.111) (0.111) (0.0734) (0.0753)
Access to information on regal rights (dummy) -0.110* -0.110* -0.0860 -0.0862 -0.0151 -0.0144 -0.0150 -0.0154
(0.0480) (0.0480) (0.0504) (0.0512) (0.0411) (0.0413) (0.0283) (0.0284)
Union member (dummy) 0.0550 0.0545 -0.0202 -0.0217 0.0647 0.0643 0.00130 -0.00141
(0.125) (0.125) (0.0852) (0.0865) (0.0998) (0.0996) (0.0764) (0.0757)
Long haul (dummy) -0.00329 -0.00378 -0.166*** -0.168*** -0.0560 -0.0557 0.0184 0.0145
(0.0525) (0.0524) (0.0427) (0.0426) (0.0407) (0.0408) (0.0314) (0.0319)
Crew size -0.000588 -0.000549 0.00182 0.00179 0.00128 0.00130 -0.00111 -0.000958
(0.00170) (0.00169) (0.00188) (0.00189) (0.00170) (0.00170) (0.00113) (0.00115)
Province: Songkla 0.208*** 0.210*** -0.108* -0.109* -0.242*** -0.241*** -0.0492 -0.0414
(0.0520) (0.0520) (0.0530) (0.0519) (0.0657) (0.0656) (0.0418) (0.0395)
Province: Rayong -0.0445 -0.0432 0.151* 0.138 -0.276*** -0.275*** -0.00408 0.000687
(0.0698) (0.0694) (0.0745) (0.0734) (0.0684) (0.0686) (0.0275) (0.0268)
Province: Samut Sakhon 0.145* 0.141* 0.297*** 0.328*** -0.250*** -0.252*** -0.204*** -0.232***
(0.0677) (0.0681) (0.0834) (0.0811) (0.0742) (0.0727) (0.0490) (0.0492)
Constant 8.831*** 8.831***
(0.161) (0.161)
N 596 596 496 496 596 596 596 596
R-sq 0.253 0.253
Source: Authors’ calculation
OLS Probit Probit Probit
ln(wage) Deduction of salary Provided welfare? Enough food?
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Table A4. Correlates of working conditions (2): working hours
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Forced 2.688* -0.793 -0.0855
(1.170) (0.668) (0.0675)
Potentially forced -0.709 -1.306* -0.00938
(0.970) (0.596) (0.0516)
Either/both forced or potentially forced -0.0390 -1.193* -0.0247
(0.939) (0.584) (0.0495)
Age -0.00594 -0.00232 -0.0474* -0.0473* 0.000409 0.000380
(0.0390) (0.0399) (0.0228) (0.0229) (0.00201) (0.00201)
Months worked as a fisherman 0.0139* 0.0128* 0.00185 0.00167 0.000207 0.000230
(0.00602) (0.00599) (0.00287) (0.00285) (0.000308) (0.000310)
Can speak/write/read in his language (dummy) -1.515 -1.779 -0.466 -0.487 0.0767 0.0795
Can speak Thai (dummy) (0.981) (0.990) (0.650) (0.651) (0.0651) (0.0648)
  None at all 5.075* 5.362* -1.735 -1.698 0.0377 0.0270
(2.094) (2.074) (1.112) (1.112) (0.101) (0.0998)
  A little 3.350 3.795 -1.718 -1.658 0.0509 0.0384
(2.057) (2.031) (1.114) (1.113) (0.0998) (0.0987)
  Fairly well / Fluently 4.842* 5.306** -1.445 -1.391 0.0874 0.0731
Years of education (2.007) (1.931) (1.139) (1.139) (0.106) (0.106)
  1 - 5 years -1.085 -0.965 -1.551 -1.531 0.0380 0.0443
(1.375) (1.345) (0.902) (0.902) (0.0752) (0.0755)
  6 - 10 years -0.917 -0.730 -1.465 -1.427 0.00892 0.0127
(1.583) (1.553) (0.993) (0.994) (0.0831) (0.0835)
  11+ years -3.326 -3.392 -2.542 -2.550 0.0965 0.104
(2.161) (2.216) (1.562) (1.564) (0.109) (0.109)
Access to information on regal rights (dummy) 0.941 0.810 -0.539 -0.529 -0.0191 -0.0178
(0.805) (0.792) (0.424) (0.423) (0.0436) (0.0438)
Union member (dummy) 1.250 1.368 -2.438* -2.434* 0.121 0.122
(1.730) (1.865) (0.956) (0.969) (0.0822) (0.0830)
Long haul (dummy) 2.191* 2.111* 1.628* 1.603* -0.142** -0.145**
(0.931) (0.956) (0.683) (0.682) (0.0535) (0.0535)
Crew size 0.0443 0.0322 0.00233 0.000619 0.00420* 0.00435**
(0.0324) (0.0337) (0.0188) (0.0186) (0.00167) (0.00167)
Province: Songkla -1.066 -1.466 0.476 0.406 0.113 0.119
(1.108) (1.128) (0.942) (0.949) (0.0657) (0.0655)
Province: Rayong 5.805*** 5.265*** -3.584*** -3.639*** 0.233*** 0.238***
(1.183) (1.184) (0.746) (0.745) (0.0638) (0.0639)
Province: Samut Sakhon 1.439 2.087 -4.304*** -4.167*** 0.0304 0.0115
(1.304) (1.288) (0.760) (0.750) (0.0790) (0.0785)
Constant 6.606* 6.805* 14.01*** 14.00***
(2.948) (2.987) (1.600) (1.610)
N 351 351 375 375 596 596
R-sq 0.247 0.219 0.251 0.249
Source: Authors’ calculation
Work hours Rest hours Enough rest?
OLS OLS Probit
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Table A5. Correlates of working conditions (3): safety
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Forced -0.0375 0.0564 0.0837
(0.0474) (0.0646) (0.0562)
Potentially forced -0.00493 0.100* 0.0306
(0.0332) (0.0428) (0.0529)
Either/both forced or potentially forced -0.0111 0.0868* 0.0436
(0.0307) (0.0384) (0.0532)
Age -0.000222 -0.000222 -0.00279 -0.00276 -0.00152 -0.00146
(0.00117) (0.00116) (0.00190) (0.00191) (0.00211) (0.00212)
Months worked as a fisherman 0.000540 0.000559 0.000809** 0.000819*** 0.0000728 0.0000445
(0.000309) (0.000314) (0.000248) (0.000247) (0.000344) (0.000343)
Can speak/write/read in his language (dummy) 0.0132 0.0148 -0.0439 -0.0433 0.0598 0.0572
Can speak Thai (dummy) (0.0373) (0.0370) (0.0602) (0.0607) (0.0615) (0.0616)
  None at all 0.172 0.161 -0.0716 -0.0809 -0.302*** -0.301***
(0.121) (0.118) (0.0866) (0.0881) (0.0410) (0.0418)
  A little 0.183 0.172 0.0507 0.0401 -0.224*** -0.221***
(0.119) (0.116) (0.0871) (0.0882) (0.0383) (0.0387)
  Fairly well / Fluently 0.148 0.135 0.0527 0.0420 -0.266*** -0.261***
Years of education (0.118) (0.116) (0.0951) (0.0964) (0.0699) (0.0699)
  1 - 5 years -0.00615 -0.00268 0.0884 0.0913 0.0166 0.0110
(0.0438) (0.0439) (0.0547) (0.0543) (0.0724) (0.0721)
  6 - 10 years 0.0321 0.0336 0.138* 0.139* 0.00365 0.000838
(0.0461) (0.0463) (0.0632) (0.0630) (0.0806) (0.0804)
  11+ years 0.0576 0.0597 0.0554 0.0606 -0.0644 -0.0724
(0.0548) (0.0552) (0.101) (0.101) (0.117) (0.117)
Access to information on regal rights (dummy) 0.0756* 0.0796* 0.0315 0.0313 -0.0828 -0.0833
(0.0342) (0.0352) (0.0376) (0.0376) (0.0450) (0.0449)
Union member (dummy) -0.158*** -0.158*** -0.00568 -0.00360
(0.0449) (0.0448) (0.108) (0.107)
Long haul (dummy) -0.0698* -0.0707* 0.0403 0.0398 0.00354 0.00778
(0.0350) (0.0356) (0.0453) (0.0450) (0.0494) (0.0493)
Crew size 0.000982 0.00110 -0.00157 -0.00145 0.00327 0.00318
(0.00117) (0.00118) (0.00152) (0.00152) (0.00183) (0.00184)
Province: Songkla 0.0549 0.0592 -0.222*** -0.221*** -0.119 -0.126*
(0.0590) (0.0585) (0.0552) (0.0559) (0.0632) (0.0635)
Province: Rayong 0.194*** 0.196*** -0.216*** -0.214*** 0.0355 0.0314
(0.0548) (0.0549) (0.0591) (0.0598) (0.0629) (0.0632)
Province: Samut Sakhon 0.169** 0.165** -0.0527 -0.0683 -0.123 -0.107
(0.0595) (0.0595) (0.0735) (0.0713) (0.0686) (0.0678)
N 596 596 596 596 596 596
Source: Authors’ calculation
First aids kits on boat
Probit Probit Probit
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Know risk points Had accident
Table A6. Correlates of working conditions (4): ill-treatment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Forced 0.0551 0.00135 0.248*** 0.268***
(0.0610) (0.0700) (0.0745) (0.0738)
Potentially forced 0.0135 -0.0444 0.111* 0.134**
(0.0416) (0.0567) (0.0483) (0.0455)
Either/both forced or potentially forced 0.0203 -0.0347 0.131** 0.150***
(0.0383) (0.0551) (0.0455) (0.0421)
Age 0.00296* 0.00296* -0.00565* -0.00567* 0.0000963 0.0000848 -0.00145 -0.00144
(0.00148) (0.00148) (0.00235) (0.00235) (0.00213) (0.00214) (0.00209) (0.00210)
Months worked as a fisherman -0.000419 -0.000433 0.000273 0.000257 0.000555 0.000527 0.000643* 0.000616*
(0.000226) (0.000227) (0.000328) (0.000327) (0.000306) (0.000310) (0.000291) (0.000296)
Can speak/write/read in his language (dummy) 0.0160 0.0138 0.0228 0.0220 -0.145* -0.148* -0.108 -0.110
Can speak Thai (dummy) (0.0404) (0.0404) (0.0635) (0.0635) (0.0686) (0.0678) (0.0671) (0.0665)
  None at all -0.00704 0.000679 0.327*** 0.333*** 0.0498 0.0664 0.00901 0.0247
(0.0819) (0.0782) (0.0746) (0.0731) (0.0865) (0.0843) (0.0838) (0.0821)
  A little -0.0359 -0.0275 0.306*** 0.312*** 0.0756 0.0944 0.0598 0.0776
(0.0767) (0.0732) (0.0720) (0.0702) (0.0843) (0.0821) (0.0834) (0.0816)
  Fairly well / Fluently -0.0355 -0.0269 0.364*** 0.370*** 0.203* 0.222* 0.0871 0.105
Years of education (0.0793) (0.0761) (0.0880) (0.0867) (0.0974) (0.0952) (0.0941) (0.0925)
  1 - 5 years -0.0267 -0.0292 -0.0225 -0.0268 0.105 0.0989 0.0207 0.0123
(0.0598) (0.0601) (0.0884) (0.0881) (0.0610) (0.0605) (0.0693) (0.0688)
  6 - 10 years -0.0120 -0.0137 0.0173 0.0137 0.227** 0.226** 0.109 0.104
(0.0658) (0.0662) (0.0970) (0.0969) (0.0706) (0.0705) (0.0782) (0.0779)
  11+ years 0.0328 0.0284 -0.0414 -0.0473 0.217 0.205 0.0252 0.0120
(0.0987) (0.0987) (0.130) (0.130) (0.119) (0.119) (0.113) (0.112)
Access to information on regal rights (dummy) -0.0155 -0.0154 -0.0447 -0.0435 0.156*** 0.159*** 0.150*** 0.152***
(0.0330) (0.0330) (0.0463) (0.0464) (0.0423) (0.0429) (0.0407) (0.0416)
Union member (dummy) 0.0968 0.0975 0.121 0.124 -0.140 -0.140 -0.221*** -0.223***
(0.104) (0.104) (0.123) (0.122) (0.0883) (0.0877) (0.0583) (0.0573)
Long haul (dummy) 0.0426 0.0444 -0.00606 -0.00497 0.0576 0.0628 0.0433 0.0482
(0.0371) (0.0372) (0.0518) (0.0519) (0.0518) (0.0524) (0.0497) (0.0505)
Crew size -0.00293* -0.00305* 0.00289 0.00281 -0.00121 -0.00151 -0.00187 -0.00213
(0.00120) (0.00120) (0.00193) (0.00193) (0.00183) (0.00184) (0.00177) (0.00177)
Province: Songkla -0.1000* -0.0993* -0.346*** -0.346*** -0.166** -0.169** -0.187*** -0.191***
(0.0399) (0.0398) (0.0667) (0.0661) (0.0560) (0.0551) (0.0556) (0.0546)
Province: Rayong 0.00419 -0.0000370 -0.0725 -0.0770 -0.0395 -0.0472 -0.0964 -0.102
(0.0539) (0.0536) (0.0784) (0.0781) (0.0644) (0.0644) (0.0633) (0.0634)
Province: Samut Sakhon -0.0309 -0.0209 0.254** 0.265*** 0.144 0.176* 0.141 0.170*
(0.0590) (0.0579) (0.0822) (0.0804) (0.0743) (0.0724) (0.0744) (0.0725)
N 596 596 552 552 596 596 596 596
Source: Authors’ calculation
Probit Probit
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Tried to escape Seen child labor Threatened Beaten
(other crew) (other crew)
Probit Probit
(1) (2) (3)
ln(wage) Deduction Provided
of salary  welfare?
OLS Probit Probit
Forced labor 0.00428 0.0803 -0.0237
(0.0495) (0.0550) (0.0456)
  Do not have legal documents -0.0881* -0.0400 -0.123**
(0.0442) (0.0467) (0.0385)
  Employer demanded to hold ID -0.0346 -0.0734 -0.0474
(0.0789) (0.0604) (0.0512)
  Not made own decision to work and deceived -0.250* 0.0731 -0.101
(0.103) (0.117) (0.0784)
  Indebt for recruitment fee -0.0425 -0.0193 -0.0394
(0.0413) (0.0431) (0.0381)
  Severely beaten 0.113 -0.167*** 0.00815
(0.0672) (0.0456) (0.0734)
  Sold/transferred to another boat 0.0380 -0.0160 -0.0939
(0.0902) (0.0878) (0.0638)
  Threatened with violence -0.0985 0.359*** -0.0946*
(0.0570) (0.0601) (0.0446)
Age -0.00164 0.00114 0.00128
(0.00204) (0.00215) (0.00186)
Months worked as a fisherman 0.00184*** 0.000566 0.000196
(0.000406) (0.000293) (0.000256)
Can speak/write/read in his language (dummy) -0.0663 -0.0389 0.110*
Can speak Thai (dummy) (0.0642) (0.0582) (0.0473)
  None at all -0.271* 0.139 0.0349
(0.106) (0.0791) (0.0728)
  A little -0.190 0.0983 0.0590
(0.109) (0.0750) (0.0702)
  Fairly well / Fluently -0.174 0.208* 0.0866
Years of education (0.111) (0.0866) (0.0785)
  1 - 5 years 0.129 -0.0842 -0.154
(0.0699) (0.0770) (0.0832)
  6 - 10 years 0.0840 -0.107 -0.170
(0.0800) (0.0859) (0.0914)
  11+ years -0.0181 -0.144 -0.177
(0.116) (0.127) (0.114)
Access to information on legal rights (dummy) -0.123* -0.102* -0.0234
(0.0480) (0.0489) (0.0405)
Union member (dummy) 0.0933 -0.0206 0.0796
(0.126) (0.0774) (0.103)
Long haul (dummy) 0.0299 -0.161*** -0.0404
(0.0551) (0.0422) (0.0428)
Crew size -0.00154 0.00177 0.000384
(0.00177) (0.00194) (0.00174)
Province: Songkla 0.226*** -0.0618 -0.222***
(0.0528) (0.0560) (0.0654)
Province: Rayong -0.0230 0.133 -0.263***
(0.0766) (0.0751) (0.0674)
Province: Samut Sakhon 0.174* 0.292*** -0.227**
(0.0676) (0.0810) (0.0719)
Constant 8.838***
(0.159)
N 596 496 596
R-sq 0.271
Source: Authors’ calculation
Table A7. Correlates of working conditions and outcomes with decomposition:
compensation of criteria for potential forced labour
Compensation
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
